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NOTES
EQUITABLE CONVERSION BY CONTRACT
Lord Esher, M. R., said of maxims, "I need hardly repeat
that I detest the attempt to fetter the law by maxims. They
are almost invariably misleading; they are for the most part
so large and general in their language that they always include
something which really is not intended to be included in them."I
As often as not the converse of a maxim can be spoken with as
much- truth as the maxim itself. Yet, upon a maxim, as ob-
noxious to objection as any maxim, namely, "Equity looks upon
that as done which ought to be done," is founded one of the
most universally accepted doctrines of the entire field of equity,
the doctrine of equitable conversion.2
According to this doctrine as soon as a contract for the
sale of land is entered into, it makes the purchase money a part
of the personal estate of the vendor, and it makes the land a
part of the real estate of the vendee.3
The doctrine of equitable conversion may be said to have
originated in a single court and that the English Court of
Chancery. It was probably first expressed in its modern form
by Lord Eldon in the case of Seaton v. Slade4 as follows:
"The effect of a contract for purchase of land is very different at
Law and in Equity. At Law the estate remains the estate of the
vendor; and the money that of the vendee. It is not so here. The
estate from the sealing of the contract is the real property of the
vendee. It descends to his heirs. It is devisable by his will; and the
question whose it is is not to be discussed merely between the vendor
and the vendee; but may be discussed between the representatives
of the vendee."
1 Yarmouth v. France, 19 Q. B. D. at 653 (1887).
2 Craig v. Leslie, 16 U. S. (3 Wheat.) 563, 4 L. Ed. 460 (1818);
Loughborough v. Loughborough, 53 Ky. (14 B. Mon.) 549 (1854); Col-
lins v. Champ, 54 Ky. (15 B. Mon.) 118 (1854); Rodisch v. Moore, 266
Ill. 106, 107 N. E. 108 (1914); Baker v. Commissioner of Corporations
and Taxation, 253 Mass. 130, 148 N. E. 593 (1925); Turner v. Hine,
297 Mo. 153, 248 S. W. 933 (1923); Moore v. Kernachan, 133 Va. 206,
112 S. E. 632 (1922); Schneider v. Schneider, 135 Kan. 734, 12 Pac.
(2d) 834 (1932); Suttler v. Ling, 25 Pa. 466 (1854).
'Lysaght v. Edwards (1867), L. R. 2 Ch. Div. 499; Collins v.
Combs, 160 Ky. 325, 169 S. W. 721 (1914).
47 Ves. Jr. 265 (1802). But see Lord King in Milner v. Milner,
Mosley 123 (1792).
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The most commonly accepted view of this doctrine was
stated by Jessel, Al. R., in Lysaght v. Edwards5 in commenting
on the legal consequences of entering into a contract for the
sale of land or any contract specifically enforceable as follows:
"Being a valid contract it has this remarkable effect, that It con-
verts the estate, so to say, in Equity; it makes the purchase money a
part of the personal estate of the vendor, and it makes the land a part
of the real estate of the vendee, and therefore all those cases on the
doctrine of constructive conversion are founded simply on this, that a
valid contract actually changes the ownership of the estate in Equity."
As has been said this doctrine is well founded in Equity
and receives almost universal acceptance, but more recently
some of our best writers have begun to investigate and to study
the basis of the doctrine and have criticised it thoroughly and
pointed out the fallacies of the doctrine.6 Some of the state
legislatures have undertaken to step in and cure some of the
defects, 7 and even a few judges have broken all precedent and
delved into the subject far enough to see that the doctrine of
5 Supra, n. 3.
O Stone--"Equitable Conversion by Contract", 13 Col. L. Rev. 369.
Simpson-"Legislative Changes in the Law of Equitable Conversion by
Contract", 44 Yale L. J. 559, 754.
"This particular corner of the law was for a long period
unusually free from legislative interference. The applicable prin-
ciples were developed in a single court-the English Court of
Chancery-beginning early in the seventeenth century and reach-
ing logical symmetry some two hundred years later in the deci-
sions of Lord Eldon and in the writings of Sugden. Later devel-
opments were regarded as being logical deductions from estab-
lished doctrines. To be sure, there have been divergencies of
view on some matters, but these have been due, for the most part,
to differences in what has been deemed sound deductive reason-
ing from accepted principles rather than to any questioning of
those premises or conscious reliance upon consideration of mun-
dane convenience or practical justice. This corner of property
law thus has, like that which includes the classic learning as to
contingent remainders and as to the classification of the Rule
against Perpetuties, an almost mathematical atmosphere. Lang-
dell's elaboration of the doctrine of Equitable Conversion, which
is the classic American exposition from a theoretical standpoint,
is as much a legal geometry as is Fearn's famous Essay. But
even in this heaven of juristic conceptions, the a-logical influence
of the legislator has been making itself felt in recent years; and
it is no longer possible to solve all problems involving Equitable
Conversion by deductive reasoning from the principles laid down
by the English Chancellors and systematized by Sugden and
Langdell."
'44 Yale L. J. 559, 561.
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equitable conversion is not a panacea in determining the rights
of the parties in cases of contracts for the sale of land.8
Even though the courts have accepted the doctrine of equi-
table conversion, they have admitted that it is purely a fiction
and is a creature of equity, unknown to the law9 and will be
invoked only when necessary to accomplish manifest justice.' 0
If this be true, then if the same manifest justice may be
reached through the application of settled and well established
legal principles the aid of the theory of equitable conversion
should never be invoked.
Let us now attempt to see if we can discover any set of
facts in which we cannot reach the same, if not more equitable,
and just results by the use of well established legal principles
as we do by applying the theory of equitable conversion and at
the same time show some instances wherein if the theory is
invoked no equitable or just result can possibly be attained.
Professor Stone" says: "It is obvious that all occasions
for the application of the doctrine of equitable conversion by
contract will arise in connection with one or two classes of cases,
which may be enumerated as follows:
1. Where the contract is actually being specifically performed.
2. Where there is no specific performance of the contract but
where the court is called upon to determine what person or class of
person is entitled to the real estate which is the subject of the con-
tract, on the one side, and the purchase money, which is obligated to
be paid, on the other."
Under the first class the court is actually engaged in com-
pelling the conversion which according to the theory of equi-
table conversion has already been converted. Then in order
to test the utility of the fiction all that is necessary to be done
is to see whether or not the same result can be reached by the
application of well established legal principles.
Suppose that A contracts in November to sell land to B,
conveyance to be made in March. If both A and B are alive at
8 Mackey v. Sherman, 263 Ill. App. 109 (1932).
"The doctrine of Equitable Conversion, while generally true,
is not without its exceptions."
oore v. Kernachan, supra, n. 2.
"0 State v. O'Connell, 121 Wash. 542, 209 Pac. 865 (1922).
13 Col. L. Rev. 369, 372.
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the time set for the conveyance everything works out all right
and there is no need for Equity to interfere unless asked at that
time to decree specific performance. But the problem is not
so simple if either A or B or both die between the sealing of
the contract and the time set for delivery. The question then
arises, in the distribution of the estate, as to just whom, the
heir or the personal representative, the land in the case of A,
the vendor, and the money in the case of B, the vendee, should
go. If the contract had been carried out prior to A's death
then the land which A had would have been exchanged for mon'ey
and that money would have gone, at A's death to the personal
representative of A. But if there had been no contract concern-
ing this land, or if A at the time of his death were still con-
sidered the owner of this land, it, the land, would have descend-
ed to A's heir. Likewise in the case of B, the vendee. If there
had been no contract the money would have gone at B's death
to the personal representative of B, but if the contract had been
carried out prior to B's death that money would have been then
exchanged for land and the land being realty would therefore
have descended to B's heir. Since this is the case it is true that
All of these parties have an interest in the subject matter of
this contract. So equity has, by invoking the aid of the maxim
that "Equity looks upon that as done which ought to be done,"
looked upon the contract as having been carried out as of the
time of the sealing of the contract;12 thereby converting the
realty into personalty and vice versa.13
Some cases have treated the vendor in such a contract as a
trustee of the land for the vendee and the vendee as a trustee
of the purchase money for the vendor.' 4 This statement though
12 Fletcher v. Ashburner, I Bro. C. C. 497 (1779).
21See Clark, Equity, Sec. 448 (1919).
"By strict logic equity-in following the maxim-should have
regarded the conversion as taking place at the time that the trus-
tees should have converted it but unless there was a time fixed for
such conversion, it would be the duty of the trustees to make the
sale or the investment within a reasonable time and it would be
obviously undesirable to have the question of the coming into
existence of equitable property rights open to such an uncertainty
as the lapse of a reasonable time. Hence courts were compelled-
consciously or unconsciously-to fall back upon the certain time
of the taking effect of the will or deed."
"Masterson v. Pullen, 62 Ala. 145 (1878); N. Y. Cent. & H. R. R.
Co. v. Cottle, et al., 168 N. Y. S. 463, 102 Misc. Rep. 30 (1917); Stewart
K. L. J.-5
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containing a germ of truth is obviously inaccurate. The vendor
is unlike a trustee in many particulars. He, the vendor, has
a personal interest in the land; he is entitled to the rents, issues,
and profits until the date of performance,' 5 he holds the title
as security for the payment of the purchase money;16 the pro-
ceeds of the insurance effected by him he holds for his own
benefit and not the benefit of the vendee. 17 The vendee, on
the other hand, is a mere debtor. He holds no specific property
for the vendor, and his sole obligation in law and in equity is
to pay the purchase money on the conveyance of the vendor's
title. More accurately stated, the obligation of the vendor in
equity is to convey land to the vendee. The vendee is the owner
of the correlative right in equity to have the vendor convey.
TPhe result, therefore, in the case of a contract for the sale
of land, where prior to time for conveyance both the vendor and
the vendee die, without invoking the aid of the theory of equi-
table conversion, is that the vendee's heir receives the same
right to specific performance which had vested in the vendee.
The vendor's heir takes the land subject to the obligation to
convey, not because he is subject to any contract obligations,
but because he is in the precise position of a donee of property
held subject to an equitable obligation. He will not be permit-
ted to retain that property in violation of that obligation any
more than would a donee of trust property be permitted to re-
tain it. The right to receive the purchase money has vested in
the personal representative of the vendor, since the right to the
proceeds of the contract, which is personal, has rightly des-
cended to the personal representative. The personal represen-
tative of the vendee is bound to pay the purchase money for the
simple reason that all obligations in contract as a matter of law
fall and rest upon the personal representative of the deceased
debtor or obligor.
So, through the mere application of settled legal prin.
ciples we have reached the same result which we would have
reached had we invoked the aid of the theory of equitable con-
v. Griffith, 31 App. D. C. 29; affirmed, 217 U. S. 323, 30 S. Ct. 528
(1908); Collins v. Combs, 160 Ky. 325, 169 S. W. 721 (1914).
Townley v. Bedwell, 14 Ves. Jr. 591 (1808).
6 6 Moore v. Burrows, et al., 34 Barb. (N. Y.) 173 (1861).
STRaynor v. Preston, L. R. 18 Ch. Div. 1 (1881).
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version. It will probably then be suggested that as we have
merely reached the same result that the fiction could do no harm
and that it does provide a convenient method for explaining the
result so reached. But this is not true in all cases. "The
difficulty with this view is that the test of equitable conversion,
viz. the sealing of the contract, for the sale of land * * * breaks
down wholly in those cases where by reason of defective title,
failure to comply with the statute of frauds, hardship, or a
reserved right to rescind the contract, a defense is interposed
to an action for the specific performance of the contract."1s
The inconsistency in which the courts have become involved
by attempting a logical application of the doctrine of equitable
conversion is exemplified in the case of option contracts. Pro-
fessor Langdell has pointed out that an option is not an offer
to enter into a bilateral contract, but is a promise to convey on
the happening of a certain condition, viz., the payment of the
purchase price.19 However, a majority of the courts hold that
an option is an offer to enter into a bilateral contract upon the
happening of a stipulated condition evidencing the option
vendee's intention to exercise the option. However, whether an
option be considered a promise or an offer it is clearly seen that
it is not such a contract as the courts will decree specific per-
formance on, before the notice of the vendee's intention to exer-
cise such option. Suppose then in the case of an option con-
tract the option vendor dies prior to the exercising of the
option by the option vendee. Certainly as there has been no
contract specifically enforceable there has been no equitable
conversion. The land descends to the vendor's heir and the
heir takes subject to the obligation to convey upon the exercising
of the option by the option vendee. According to the doctrine
of equitable conversion, that the conversion takes place at the
time of the sealing of the contract, then when the option vendee
exercises his option and there is a "sealing of the contract" the
land has already descended to the heir completely and the heir
being the complete owner would be entitled to the purchase
money. But, in fact, this is not the desired result since as a
matter of law the personal representative is supposed to receive
Stone, 13 Col. L. Rev. 369, 375.
"Langdell, "Equitable Conversion", 13 Harv. L. Rev. 2; Langdell,
A Brief Survey of Equity Jurisdiction, p. 261.
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the proceeds of the contract, which of itself is personalty. So to
avoid this discrepancy, and still hold to the fiction of equitable
conversion, the courts have coined another fiction, that of re-
lation; saying that when the option is exercised and the contract
is sealed, that it relates back to the date of the giving of the op-
tion, thus somehow jerking the title which it has placed in the
heir out of the heir and making the conversion take place as of
the date of the giving of the option,2 0 which says in effect that
the heir has been holding personalty and the personal repres-
tative of the option vendee has been enjoying the use of realty.
"Legal fictions are often relied upon by courts to prevent
a failure of justice, but it is believed that no other case will be
found in the books where courts have made use of a fiction for
the purpose of divesting rights deemed to have beeen honestly
acquired."
However the personal representative's right to receive this
purchase money does not rest upon this fiction, but is based
upon the legal principles of the devolution of decedent's prop.
perty.22 The heir has taken the land as a donee of property
subject to an option. The rights under this option to receive
the proceeds of the contract when and if it is made are personal
and therefore go to the personal representative.
Likewise in the case of the heir and personal represen-
tative of the vendee. The right to receive the land which will
be the subject of the contract when and if the option is exercised
goes to the heir because the land is realty. The personal rep-
resentative is obligated to pay the purchase price since if he
refused he would be unjustly enriched at the expense of the
heir, a situation which equity will not permit.
It is apparent that these cases not only do not rest upon any
doctrine of equitable conversion, but that it is not a safe
or intelligible guide to the results actually reached by the
decisions.
There still remains for consideration the case where, pend-
ing performance of the contract for the sale of land, a sub-
"Smith v. Lowenstein, 50 Ohio St. 346 (1893); Rockland Co. v.
Leary, 203 N. Y. 469 (1911). But see Lawes v. Bennett, 1 Cox Eq. Cas.
167 (1785).
2Langdell, A Brief Survey of Equity Jurisdiction, p. 272.
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stantial part of the subject matter of the contract is destroyed
through no fault of the vendor. On whom should this loss fall?
Obviously if the doctrine of equitable conversion is appled
then because the vendee is really the owner of the premises
the loss should fall on him.23 But is this an equitable result?
The time comes for the performance of the contract. The vend-
ee because of this depletion in value does not want to carry out
the contract and pay the price called for by the contract, but
the vendor goes into Equity and asks a decree of specific per-
formance. Should this decree be granted? If the court holds
to its fiction of equitable conversion it must grant the decree.
But here is the situation. Say for example the contract called
for the conveyance of a house and lot, the house valued at
$5,000 and the lot valued only at $1,000. The house has burned
between the time of the making of the contract and the
time specified for conveyance. What the vendor then is asking
is that the vendee be compelled to deliver over his part of the
contract, the full purchase price while he, the vendor can only
partially fulfill his obligation. It is impossible for the vendor
to even tender what the contract demands that he convey. The
doctrine of equitable conversion says that the land already
belongs to the vendee and that the loss is his, but is this equi-
table? The vendee has not enjoyed the possession, nor has he
received any of the rents and profits. 24
The problem of risk of loss under a contract for the sale
of land has'been much discussed by legal writers, and at least
five different theories have been advanced. 25 These are:
1. That the risk of loss should be on the vendor until legal
title is conveyed. 26
2. That the risk of loss should be on the vendor until the
time agreed upon for the conveyance of the legal title, and
thereafter on the purchaser, unless the vendor is then in such
214 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence, Sec. 1406.
"It follows therefore (from the doctrine of equitable conver-
sion), that the purchaser being the equitable owner is entitled to
all the benefits and assumes all the risks of ownership."
21 icGinley v. Forest, 107 Neb. 309, 186 N. W. 74 (1921). But see
dissent by Dean, J., in this case.
Chaffee and Simpson, Cases on Equity, 961.
2" Stone, "Equitable Conversion by Contract", 13 Col. L. R. 369.
See also 12 Col. Law R. 257.
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default as to be then unable to specifically enforce the contract.27
3. That the risk of loss should be on the party in possession,
whether the vendor or purchaser.28
4. That the risk of loss should be on the vendor unless
there is something in the contract or the relations of the parties
from which the court can infer a different intention. 29
5. That the risk of loss should be on the purchaser from
the time the vendor-purchaser relation arises.30
The writer thinks that the view expressed in number four,
that is, that the loss should be on the vendor unless there is
something in the contract or the relation of the parties from
which the court can infer a different intention, is the most
nearly equitable and just view, but wishes to explain further
that the phrase, "something in the contract or the relation of
the parties from which the court can infer a different intention"
should include a consideration of the following: who is in posses-
sion; who is bearing the burden of taxes; who is receiving the
rents and profits from the land; and whether or not a note has
been given for the purchase price upon which the purchaser
is paying interest.
From a consideration of all of these cases the fallacies and
inconsistencies resulting in the application of the theory of equi-
table conversion may be clearly seen. True these may all be
regarded as being logical deductions from established premises
but the fault has been, not in the deductive reasoning, but in the
blind acceptance of the major premises as true without ever
questioning the soundness of such major premises. No matter
how sound the deductive reasoning be, if the premises from
which the deduction is made be unsound, how then can the
results of the deductions be sound?
R. T. MiLLER.
Langdell, Brief Survey of Equity Jurisdiction (2d ed.), 58-65.
2'Williston, "The Risk of Loss after an Executory Contract for
Sale in the Common Law", 9 Harv. L. R. 106; 2 Williston on Con-
tracts, Secs. 927-953.
: Vanneman, "Risk of Loss in Equity Between the Date of the
Contract to Sell Real Estate and Transfer of Title", S Minn. L.
R. 127.
-O Keener, "The Burden of Loss as an Incident of the Right to
Specific Performance of a Contract", 1 Col. L. R. 1; 5 Pomeroy,
Equity Jurisprudence (4th ed.), Sec. 2282; Pound, "Progress of the
Law-Equity", 33 Harv. L. R. 813, 826.
